I will argue that utilitarianism is a reasonable ethical theory to demonstrate that we have a duty to accord equal moral consideration to sentient beings, in this case nonhuman animals. I will illustrate, according to utilitarian criteria, that nonhuman animals are indeed sentient and that it is sufficient to count for moral standing. I will defend my argument with examples of practices commonly used in treating animals as a resource, such as for food, and in laboratory experiments. This will demonstrate that any action that does not treat animals as beings with moral standing violates animal rights, and is therefore morally impermissible. I will begin by showing why utilitarian theory justifies my claim in providing a strong argument for nonhuman animals. The theory says that an action is morally right if it brings the greatest utility to all those affected by it compared to any other alternative action, in other words, “the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people.” As for my argument on behalf of nonhuman animals, I should summarize all the interests of all groups affected (humans and nonhuman animals) by my actions and choose the one with the greatest net satisfaction. Utilitarianism is used in my argument because it implies some good ethical properties. It is said to be universal, as it addresses the interests of all those affected, regardless of any trait or characteristic. Everyone should adopt this rule. This theory also addresses what is morally good in terms of well-being, or rather our satisfaction or dissatisfaction, such as the interest in a happy and pleasant life. This theory is best known for being consequentialist because it tells us that the right action is the one that maximizes utility or produces the best consequences. And finally, utilitarian... middle of paper... mineral, does not add more utility. To ignore the suffering of nonhuman animals is to ignore the fact that they have moral consideration. Other moral theories, such as Kantianism, believe that we have no duties towards non-human animals, but we do have duties towards them because being cruel would reflect on us. I have reason to believe that we have an obligation to them because we are not simply disrespecting ourselves; we are doing these non-human animals a disservice. An independent mistake is made when, for example, a severely brain-damaged child is whipped or sets fire to a cat. When you feel compassion for a suffering animal, it is because you have reason to change its condition. Their cries are no less heartfelt than the words of a human being. Another animal can force you in exactly the same way as another person. The question is not whether they can reason or speak, but whether they can suffer?