Why do nations obey international law? While I am not a native English speaker, and you may infer this by reading the article, I should first state that the question answers a poor choice of words, which prevents researchers intending to answer the question from finding a correct answer. All in all, it must be clarified what we are really trying to mean by using the word "nation". There are several definitions of the word. John Salmond's definition is perhaps one of the most accepted definitions: “The closest we can come to a definition is to say that a nation is a group of people bound together by a common history, common feelings and traditions and, usually (although not always, like, for example, Belgium or Switzerland) by common heritage. A state, on the other hand, is a society of men united under a single government. These two forms of society are not necessarily coincident. A single nation may be divided into several states, and conversely a single state may comprise several nations or parts of nations." Any research, if not supported by sufficient sociological data, will most likely fail to understand the behavioral pattern of a nation. However, when you look at the articles, you may, or at least should, realize that they are looking at patterns of behavior of states or governments. That's why it will be more accurate to use the word “state,” “government,” or another word that more accurately describes the subject of your search. The second imprecise word choice is “obey.” Wittgenstein observes: "When I obey a rule, I do not choose, I obey the law blindly." As realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, and Hans Morgenthau more accurately assert, nations do not obey the internatio...... middle of paper ......isa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System : Extralegal contractual relationships in the diamond industry. 21 Journal of Legal Studies 115, 1992Barak D. Richman, Corporations, Courts, and the Reputation Mechanism: Toward a Positive Theory of Private Law, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2328. P2340-2344, 2004Id.Eli Berman, Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An Economist's View of Ultra-Orthodox Jews, 115 QJ Econ. 905, p921-29, 2000Barak D. Richman, Firms, courts and the reputation mechanism: towards a positive theory of private ordering, 104 column. L. Rev. 2328. P2346, 2004 George W. Downs and Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance and International Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. 95, p95, 2002Id.Eric Singer and Valerie Hudson, Conclusion: Political Psychology/Foreign Policy, the Cognitive Revolution, and International Relations, in Political Psychology and Foreign Policy,p256