In our social environment we run the risk of someone lying to us, distorting a fact when reproducing it, or perhaps completely omitting an important detail. It is well known that people tell a lie from time to time. The high prevalence of deception and lying is well documented in research (e.g., DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). Our ability to notice or recognize deceptions and lies and, in the next stage, respond appropriately is not far-reaching. We are only marginally capable of distinguishing true from false. Even trained people, such as police officers, are only slightly better than a lay person at detecting liars. They are also no longer sure that a person is telling the truth (Akehurst, Koehnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996). Function of DistrustHowever, due to the very high probability of being deceived and being deceived in combination with our inability to know whether we can confer faith on someone, a good part of distrust can be considered healthy and in some extreme cases even important for survival? Previous research has shown that distrust leads to deeper and more accurate processing of information and as a possible consequence to the formation of alternative hypotheses, the so-called counter-scenarios (Schul, Burnstein, & Bardi, 1996; Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2008). Distrust leads to more elaborate information processing that allows you to control possible alternative explanations and possible inconsistencies. We start from the assumption that one of the most relevant functions of mistrust is not to be guided by a first impression, or by an obvious plausibility (Schul et al., 2008): "mistrust is interpreted as the tendency of individuals to... .... half of the paper......). We also asked them how they felt at that moment (scale from -50 to +50). Memory test. The subjects were then informed that the next task would again be based on the report read at the beginning of the study. They were told that their memory for these reports would now be tested. The subjects were subjected to twenty statements (10 per report). They had to specify on a case-by-case basis (on a scale of 1 to 4) whether or not this statement coincided in content with the report. They were asked to decide as quickly and spontaneously as possible. Per report, five statements were consistent with the report and another five were not consistent with the story/report and represented a so-called counter scenario. We were interested in the false alarm rate, as a proxy for the formation of counter-scenarios. Finally the participants had to answer some demographic questions. Results