he will be both pious and impious (for he will be dear to some gods and not dear to others). Third attempt by Euthyphro After some suggestions from Socrates, Euthyphro establishes the following definition of piety: "the pious is that which all the gods love, and the opposite, that which all the gods hate, is impious." (9e) Socrates' objection: This is where Socrates raises (what we called in class) the Euthyphro problem. He asks Euthyphro whether "the pious is loved by the gods because he is pious, or is something pious because he is loved by the gods?" (10a) The idea here is that there must be an order of explanation. Either the gods recognize pious things and love them because they are pious, or the gods simply love whatever they do, and it is because the gods love these things that they are pious. It seems then that we are faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, if we say that things are pious because the gods love them, then it seems that what is pious or not depends on the arbitrary whim of the gods. Because what the gods may love or dislike seems to be as arbitrary as whether or not you like mint chocolate chip ice cream. That godliness and godlessness could be willy-nilly as all of this seems to go against our initial intuitions about what godliness is. However, on the other hand, if things are pious independently of the gods, and gos end up loving pious things because they are already pious, then it seems that the role of the gods is diminished. For why should we need gods if things are pious and impious independently of them? Furthermore, defining “pity” as that which all gods love brings us no closer to understanding what pity is. Indeed, it may be beautiful and right that all the gods love what is pious, but Socrates wanted to know what piety was, not what its consequence was (for example, that all the gods love it). This leads Socrates to complain: "you have told me an affection or quality [of the pious], that the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but you have not yet told me what the pious is." (11b) Euthyphro's fourth attempt Once again urged by Socrates, Euthyphro then tries to say how right actions and pious actions are related. He then states that "the pious and pious is the part of the just that deals with the care of the gods, while that which deals with the care of men is the remaining part of justice." (12e) Please note: this is just an example. Get a custom paper from our expert writers now. Get a Custom Essay The idea goes something like this: Justice covers many things, things that have to do with gods and men. Piety, on the other hand, has to do only with the right things that concern only the gods (and not men). So while all godly things are right, not all right things are godly.

Topic > he will be both pious and impious (for he will be dear to some gods and not dear to others). Third attempt by Euthyphro After some suggestions from Socrates, Euthyphro establishes the following definition of piety: "the pious is that which all the gods love, and the opposite, that which all the gods hate, is impious." (9e) Socrates' objection: This is where Socrates raises (what we called in class) the Euthyphro problem. He asks Euthyphro whether "the pious is loved by the gods because he is pious, or is something pious because he is loved by the gods?" (10a) The idea here is that there must be an order of explanation. Either the gods recognize pious things and love them because they are pious, or the gods simply love whatever they do, and it is because the gods love these things that they are pious. It seems then that we are faced with a dilemma: on the one hand, if we say that things are pious because the gods love them, then it seems that what is pious or not depends on the arbitrary whim of the gods. Because what the gods may love or dislike seems to be as arbitrary as whether or not you like mint chocolate chip ice cream. That godliness and godlessness could be willy-nilly as all of this seems to go against our initial intuitions about what godliness is. However, on the other hand, if things are pious independently of the gods, and gos end up loving pious things because they are already pious, then it seems that the role of the gods is diminished. For why should we need gods if things are pious and impious independently of them? Furthermore, defining “pity” as that which all gods love brings us no closer to understanding what pity is. Indeed, it may be beautiful and right that all the gods love what is pious, but Socrates wanted to know what piety was, not what its consequence was (for example, that all the gods love it). This leads Socrates to complain: "you have told me an affection or quality [of the pious], that the pious has the quality of being loved by all the gods, but you have not yet told me what the pious is." (11b) Euthyphro's fourth attempt Once again urged by Socrates, Euthyphro then tries to say how right actions and pious actions are related. He then states that "the pious and pious is the part of the just that deals with the care of the gods, while that which deals with the care of men is the remaining part of justice." (12e) Please note: this is just an example. Get a custom paper from our expert writers now. Get a Custom Essay The idea goes something like this: Justice covers many things, things that have to do with gods and men. Piety, on the other hand, has to do only with the right things that concern only the gods (and not men). So while all godly things are right, not all right things are godly.