Berle and Means (1932) corporatization reforms involve the transformation of control rights from individual managers to professional managers. The separation of ownership and control leads to the root of agency problems, conflicts of interest between different parties. Furthermore, according to Shleifer and Vishny (1997), it can be stated more generally that the essence of the agency problem arises from the separation between management and finance. Funds raised from investors can be used to invest in further production or to cash out companies' stakes. Sometimes, due to lack or insufficiency of owners' funds and resources, managers need additional funds from investors to support investment opportunities or meet financial obligations of enterprises. As a result, investors have high demands and expectations on the management team to run companies better and thus generate returns on their investments. The agency problem has become a widespread concern among listed companies and the Chinese stock market. They are looking for corporate governance incentive mechanisms that can help align the different interests between owners and managers, and monitoring mechanisms that can provide prevention or guarantees that corporate funds and resources are not expropriated or