Hunger and PovertyHunger and Poverty Throughout this particular essay, I will demonstrate many points to you. Perhaps not to the point of changing the way we think about hunger and poverty in the world, but enough to distinguish between moral obligation and moral capacity. What I will not mention is the fact that Peter Singer's (1971) outdated material, while thorough in the sense of supporting his view on world hunger and poverty and examining this school of thought, is unconvincing to say the least. As our recent past has shown us, using Somalia and Rwanda as models, no amount of money or time in the world can intervene in a civil war. Terrible things happen, innocent people are killed in the name of freedom or captivity, and the earth is destroyed, burned by the flames of righteousness or wrath. But placing the burden of trying to heal these wounds on the “well-off” is not only immoral in itself, it is also insane. To consider an act a moral obligation, it must have a purpose that falls within the scope of reason. If someone is forced to do something, then the purpose of that action has meaning, thus making the act a meaningful act. Characteristic of a significant act is a justly important end, that is, an end that has a higher purpose than the action against the obligatory act. It can be argued, using history as an example, that ending world poverty and hunger is not a reasonable goal. Singer uses the term “brunette...
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